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Global ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a new type of warfare that is characterized by its 
fast tempo and little force movement. Time budgets for executing kill-chain tasks during an 
engagement are highly constrained, making it necessary to rely on high degrees of automation of 
all aspects of decision-making except in cases in which a tracked object requires the attention of 
a human operator.  This paper examines three C2 structures for BMD: (i) a hierarchical structure 
based on current organization, (ii) a compressed structure with one global commander and 
separate regional commanders, and (iii) a flattened chain of command in which all resources are 
allocated directly to a single commander.  We develop simulation models for the three command 
structures using the OMNeT++ software, and compare their effect on the effectiveness of a 
BMD to engage threats based on the number of messages generated and processed among the 
nodes in the structure, and the threat processing time under three scenarios of increasing 
difficulty.  Our results indicate that a compressed chain of command produces the fastest time, 
although the flattened chain of command produces the least amount of message passing. 
 
1. Introduction 
There is an urgent need for DoD to develop a global Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) to protect the United States and its allies against multiple concurrent hostile missile 
attacks. The BMDS will provide a layered global defense against ballistic missiles of all classes 
(short-, medium-, and long-range).  The BMDS is a system-of-systems made up of an amalgam 
of sensor networks, track databases, weapons systems, and command and control (C2) systems.  
The command and control/battle management of the BMDS is a core element of the system-of-
systems; this element is called the Command and Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications (C2BMC) system. The C2BMC system is a globally distributed, real-time, 
software-intensive battle-management system that must exhibit highly predictable system-
software behavior, in which the system receives sensor information from land, sea, air, and 
space, and commits land-, sea-, air-, and space-based weapons to fire at identified targets.   
 
Global ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a new type of warfare that is characterized by its 
fast tempo and little force movement. Due to the speed of engagements, quantity of battle-related 
information, and complexity of the decision processing, all or which must adhere to strict time 
budgets for executing battle plans, it is necessary for battle commanders to rely on high degrees 
   
of automation of all aspects of decision-making except in cases in which a tracked object 
requires the attention of a human operator.   
 
BMD does not easily fit into the traditional military molds. Future missile defense battles 
may involve simultaneous threats to be fought in multiple regions and theaters. The speed of 
engagements and amount of information to be processed necessitate weapons-target pairing, 
launch decisions, and engagement control to be performed locally, while the need to accomplish 
the global missile defense objectives requires system-wide coordination of threat engagement 
responsibilities and national resources among regional commanders in real-time. Moreover, a 
successful BMD engagement can involve resources that are owned by other commands and 
located outside of the region in which the battle is fought. Existing C2 structures need to be 
modernized to streamline the real-time coordination of battle responsibilities and engagement 
resources. 
 
There are few instances of such a global battlespace control. The Nuclear Triad is one 
possible example of global centralized C2, but that organization has never had the numbers of 
elements that the BMDS will have. The use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams in the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) is another possible example, but the SOF teams do not, 
generally, have interdependencies that extend more than the range of the longest artillery round 
or the longest standoff weapon. Therefore, the operation of the BMDS is deemed to be different 
than that of other forms of modern warfare; to that end, the application of a conceptual model is 
also different. 
 
A key element in all aspects of a successful global missile defense battle is the conservation 
of time.  Time is the most critical resource in missile defense and therefore each element of the 
system must be optimized to expend the minimum time possible.  As each phase of the kill chain 
(detect, track, assign weapon, engage, assess kill) is examined to wring out wasted time within 
the automated systems moving the data, so too must the human decision process be examined for 
time-economy.  Just as we seek the best system architecture, we must also seek the best C2 
structure.   
 
This paper examines three C2 structures for BMD: (i) a hierarchical structure based on 
current organization, (ii) a compressed structure with one global commander and separate 
regional commanders, and (iii) a flattened chain of command in which all resources are allocated 
directly to a single commander.  Our study builds on two prior research effort conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, the first of which proposes and compares three distinct command 
architectures [5] and the second providing a methodology for modeling message passing within 
components of the C2BMC [3].  We develop simulation models for the three structures using the 
OMNeT++ software [4], and compare their impact on the effectiveness of a BMD system to 
engage threats based on the number of messages generated and processed among the nodes in the 
structure, and the threat processing time under three scenarios of increasing difficulty. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the information flow in a 
global missile defense battle and establishes a baseline for what information needs to be passed 
between the various components of the BMDS regardless of C2 structure.  Section 3 presents a 
simulation model of the existing BMD C2 structure to identify its limitations. Section 4 presents 
   
the simulation models of two proposed BMD C2 structures designed to mitigate the limitations 
of the existing BMD C2 structure. Section 5 discusses the simulation results and Section 6 draws 
the conclusion. 
 
2. Essential C2 Messaging Requirements for BMD 
In order to model a C2 architecture, we must first determine what messages we expect to be 
passed between the components.  Administrative messages may vary depending on the level of 
coordination and reporting criteria set forth by the commander.  Connectivity messages (e.g., 
pings, weapons heath and status) are highly dependent on the network implementation and 
specific to the sensors, weapons and other technologies utilized in the system. Our primary 
interest is not on administrative or connectivity messages but instead to discover and fine-tune 
those messages that are tactically essential and must be passed between elements regardless of 
the C2 structure, commander’s expectation, or network design.   
 
Our evaluation of efficiency is, to some extent, dependent on how these messages are 
handled in each model.  In other words, we want to determine which structure handles these 
messages most efficiently while avoiding redundancy, minimizing traffic volume, and increasing 
the overall speed of the process. The search for these essential messages leads us back to the kill 
chain.  Although there are many different versions of the kill chain (one for each service and one 
expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), we will use the one presented by Caffall [1] that 
incorporates aspects of each: Plan, Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess, because it 
captures each element of the BMD mission.  After all, the overall goal of any C2 structure is to 
aid completion of these military tasks quickly and accurately. Our analysis resulted in the 
identification of the following essential message types: 
1. Cueing Data 
2. Sensor Tasking 
3. Track Data 
4. Weapon Assignment 
5. Weapons Order Acknowledgement 
6. Weapons Order Refusal (CAN’T CO) 
7. Weapons/Sensor Pairing 
8. Weapons inventory update (weapon fired) 
9. Engagement Status (subordinate to senior) 
 
By identifying the essential messages, we can eliminate unnecessary traffic; this task is as 
important as choosing the right C2 structure for BMD.  Notice also that there are some messages 
one could expect to be listed under a typical C2 structure that are missing from our list.   
 
Since planning will be conducted via a variety of means (e.g., e-mail, phone calls, 
conferences) and is conducted prior to battle, we will focus on the remaining set, the 
performance of which constitutes battle in the BMD context.  We wish to see how a particular 
structure facilitates C2 functions during the battle itself when time constraints are most radical, 
not during preparations when they are less a factor. We also choose to eliminate the classic 
senior/subordinate interaction such as requests for permission/permission-granted messages.  We 
   
argue that given the limited time to prosecute an engagement, such messages which rely on serial 
communication are simply impractical.  The decision to engage must take place as soon as it is 
clear that an enemy threat is unfolding (the cueing stage).  In fact, it is our contention that each 
of the messages we have listed can and should be automated, much like how a warship can 
enable its air defense system or enables a programmed, automated pre-planned response.  Once 
things are set in motion, the only decision for commanders is to allow things to continue, or stop 
the process due to concerns over safety of friendly forces or a sense that an error has occurred.      
 
3. Analysis of the Existing BMD C2 Structure 
To understand the existing BMD C2 structure, one must start with the Unified Command 
Plan (UCP).  The UCP clearly delineates military combatant commands, missions, functions, and 
geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR).  Further, it promotes a streamlined planning process 
between commands at levels in the command hierarchy.  The UCP distinguishes the combatant 
commanders (COCOMS) under one of two categories: geographic missions as defined by AORs 
or regions, and functional commands which provide specific capabilities to execute particular 
missions worldwide.  The COCOMS under the constraint of regional missions are the U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the U.S. European Command (EURCOM), the U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM).  Other COCOMS, such as the U.S. Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM), and the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), fall under the 
umbrella of functional commands and are usually in the supporting role to the supported 
COCOMS that have cognizance over specific AORs [2]. 
 
Under the current UCP, the overall BMD operations will fall under the supervision of 
NORTHCOM because NORTHCOM has been charged with the overall responsibility for 
homeland defense.  Both STRATCOM and NORAD, along with other COCOMS, will assume 
the roles of supporting commands.  The supporting commands will in turn have tactical control 
of units with an arsenal of sensors and weapons.  Ultimately, NORTHCOM is responsible to the 
Unified Command System (White House, Pentagon), which maintains total authority over all 
decisive courses of action. Although other COCOMS are in a supporting relationship to 
NORTHCOM, each COCOM has a direct link to the Unified Command System to provide 
redundant C2 capability from the highest echelon of command should a link latency or even 
failure from NORTHCOM to any of the supporting commands threaten successful prosecution of 
a missile.  Regional commanders, COCOMS that have responsibility over a specific region, 
maintain tactical control of units with numerous resources including an assortment of sensors 
and weapons that are networked through the region.  Under the current C2 structure, when a 
missile launch is anticipated by an intelligence source, cueing data will initiate the flow of 
information.  It is important to note that the model we have adopted represents only one of many 
possible scenarios particularly with respect to intelligence.   
 
3.1 The Simulation Model of the Existing BMD C2 Structure 
Figure 1 shows the OMNeT++ simulation model we constructed for the existing BMD C2 
structure. OMNeT++, which stands for Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++, is an 
   
object-oriented discrete-event simulator primarily designed for the simulation of communication 
protocols, communication networks and traffic models, and models of multiprocessor and 
distributed systems.  OMNeT++ provides three principal constructs (modules, gates, and 
connections) for modeling the structures of a target system. An OMNeT++ simulation model 
consists of a set of modules communicating with each other via the sending and receiving of 
messages. Modules can be nested hierarchically. The atomic modules are called simple modules; 
they are coded in C++ and executed as co-routines on top of the OMNeT++ simulation kernel. 
Gates are the input and output interfaces of the modules. Messages are sent out through output 
gates of the sending module and arrive through input gates of the receiving module. Input and 
output gates are linked together via connections. Connections represent the communication chan-
nels and can be assigned properties such as propagation delay, bit error rate and data rate. 
Message can contain arbitrarily complex data structures and can be sent either directly to their 
destination via a connection or through a series of connections (called route.) 
 
 
Figure 1.  Model of Current C2 Structure. 
 
The model shown in Figure 1 consists of 18 modules: an intelligent source 
(INTEL_SOURCE), a global missile defense command (Global_Authority),  a supporting 
command (Supporting_Command), three regional commands (AOR1, AOR2, AOR3), three 
tactical missile defense units (SUB_UNIT_1, SUB_UNIT_2, SUB_UNIT_3), five sensors (sensor, 
sensor0, sensor1, sensor2, sensor3) and four weapons (weapon, weapon1, weapon2, weapon3). 
The model, which is based on unclassified information, represents the hierarchical levels through 
which the United States will conduct missile defense where 
• INTEL_SOURCE represents the National Command Authority (Unified Command 
System) 
• Global Authority represents NORTHCOM 
• Supporting Command represents Missile Defense Authority (STRATCOM, NORAD)  
• AOR represents supporting regional COCOM  
• SUB_UNIT represents units under tactical control of Regional COCOMS 
   
 
Our model shows intelligence flow from the top to the bottom, but this intelligence may be 
received at the middle or lowest levels and we assume that it would then be sent up and back 
down along with appropriate orders. Once cueing data is received by units with sensors, those 
sensors are tasked to direct energy towards the threat axis to improve the chance of detection. 
After detection, track data is passed up through the chain of command and detecting sensors are 
paired with organic weapons1 at the COCOM level first, and at the national level (NORAD) 
next. Throughout this flow of data, the data is processed by appropriate authority at each level of 
command to ensure proper target discrimination as well as de-confliction of any duplicate 
tracking of the missile.  Between the regional COCOM and the unit commander, proper 
coordination takes place in the form of one or more of the message types specified in Section 2.  
Should the assigned prosecuting commander be unable to execute the mission, the appropriate 
message (CAN’T CO) will be passed back through the chain of command to the appropriate 
level in order for either the regional COCOM or higher level of authority to decide whether to 
reassign of sensors and weapons. 
 
Our simulation of missile defense via the current C2 structural model will be executed under 
three different scenarios: 
(i) Single threat missile, single AOR 
(ii) Multiple threat missiles, multiple phases of flight, same AOR 
(iii) Multiple threat missiles, multiple phases of flight, multiple AORs 
The single threat missile/single AOR scenario depicts the simplest case in which a single 
missile is launched from a single nation state.  The multiple threat missiles/multiple phases of 
flight/same AOR scenario replicates the possibility of multiple missiles being launched at 
staggered times from the same region, possibly from the same nation state.  The last scenario, 
multiple threat missiles/multiple phases of flight/multiple AORs, represents the grim yet 
distinctly possible reality of multiple staggered launches emanating from two or more different 
AORs; the only conceivable case that is not related to one of these scenarios is one in which 
threat missiles are launched inside the national (NORTHCOM) AOR but not in any of the lower 
(i.e., more distant) COCOM AORs, such as an attack from barges or ships just a few nautical 
miles off either coast of our homeland. 
 
3.2 The Simulation Results 
Using the model depicted in Figure 1, we simulated all three scenarios.  We implemented the 
passing of messages between the levels of command and observed the timing of message passing 
in 100 iterations.  Our objective was to observe the automation of message passing and analyze 
the results in order to derive an evaluation of the rate of interception.  In doing so, we 
implemented parameters that were used as metrics to facilitate the analysis of message passing. 
The parameters used include: TIME_TO_CONSIDER_INTEL, TIME_TO_PROCESS_NOGO, 
TIME_TO_EVALUATE_KILL_NO_KILL, TIME_TO_PAIR, PERCENT_CHANCE_OF_DETECTION, 
TIME_TO_DETECT, MAX_SALVO_SIZE, PERCENT_CHANCE_OF_KILL, TIME_TO_PROCESS_STATUS, 
and GLOBAL_SENSOR_TRACK_DELAY.   Each iterative running of the OMNeT++ model yielded 
the results of the simulation as depicted in Figure 2.  The window confirms the number of threat 
                                                 
1 A resource is considered “organic” by a commander if it is under his or her tactical control. 
   
missiles and the number of AORs for each scenario.  This information is followed by a sequence 
of narrative of the actions taken at successive levels of command as the missile interception is 
attempted through the phases of flight.  Figure 2 is representative of the worst-case scenario 
involving multiple missiles from multiple AORs.   
 
 
Figure 2.  OMNeT++ Simulation Result. 
 
The model was simulated 100 times for each of the three scenarios.  The summary of the 
simulation results are shown below.  
 
 
Table 1.  Single Missile, Single AOR summary results 
 
 
Table 2.  Multiple Missiles, Single AOR summary results 
 
 
Table 3.  Multiple Missiles, Multiple AORs summary results 
 
 
Remember that our simulation model was designed to capture the amount of time and 
number of messages required to process the average threat missile given these conditions.  The 
atomic modules that make up these models have defined “behavior” or coded routines for 
handling each of the nine types of messages that they may encounter.  Given that each of the 
module-types take the same action given the same inputs (i.e., messages), and the same random 
variables and constants are used (e.g., the chances for detection or kill and delays time for each 
message), we can compare them on equal footing for the number of messages and time used in 
the average case.  Note that time and the number of messages are related, as more messages 
incur a bigger time delay for processing.  
   
 
Figure 3 shows that, as one might expect, the number of messages that are passed increases 
with complexity.  The number of messages exchanged between the commands rises steadily 
from approximately 100 messages in a single missile/single AOR scenario to over 450 messages 
in the multiple missile/multiple AOR scenario; this increase in message traffic will certainly be 
taxing to any network and might lead to complications and ultimately be culpable in decreasing 
the success rate as the scenario becomes more complex.  However, we were surprised to find that 
the effect was the exact opposite when each level of command was closely scrutinized for the 
number of messages that were sent and received, as shown in Figure 4. On closer inspection, we 
discovered a simple explanation for the decreasing average number of messages per threat 
missile by each command as the complexity of the situation is compounded by greater numbers 
of missiles and AORs:  as the threat missiles progress through the phases of flight, if an assigned 
weapon cannot engage and complete a successful prosecution, then the only message that the 
weapon sends is a single CAN’T CO to his higher command, as opposed to multiple messages 
relating the successful tracking and prosecution of the missile if the weapon had successfully 



























Figure 4.  Messages per Threat Missile 
 
messages per threat missile 


















Figure 5.  Processing Time per Threat Missile 
 
This illustrates the fact that some reduction of the ratio of messages per threat missile and 
processing time per threat missile in the more complex scenarios can be attributed not only to the 
command structure, but to the simple fact that NORTHCOM has a limited number of resources, 
which become particularly strained when lower echelons hand off engagements simultaneously.  
We anticipate that this structure will be revealed as inefficient in terms of congestion due to 
duplicate message passing, some of which have associated delays, which, in reality, will further 
limit the number of opportunities for engagements. 
 
In our model, since boost-phase engagements are limited to 120 seconds and engagement of 
any one threat cannot exceed 600 seconds total,2 the number of interceptors fired per threat 
missile decreases with added complexity of the scenario, as noted in Figure 6.  Again, this is not 
a metric in which we are specifically interested, but is a phenomenon we felt worth noting. 
 











Figure 6.  Interceptors Fired Per Threat Missile 
 
3.3 Limitations of the existing C2 structure 
Data from preliminary simulation runs show that the amount of messages will overload the 
network in anything more complex than a single missile/single AOR scenario.  The significant 
increase in message congestion and decrease in processing time available for each threat in the 
                                                 
2 These values are points of reference rather than absolute. 
   
current C2 structure correlate to the increase in the number of threat missiles and the number of 
launch-points.  We observed this during Desert Storm, with the simultaneous launching of 
multiple SCUD missiles to different designated areas of operations of coalition forces.  It is a fair 
assessment to declare that the current C2 architecture is not organizationally optimal in 
confronting varied scenarios that present greater challenges in terms in increasing numbers of 
factors, be it the missiles or the origination of the missiles. 
 
4. Alternative BMD C2 Structures 
In this section, we present two alternative BMD C2 structures in an attempt to streamline the 
chain of command in BMD.  
 
4.1 Compressed C2 Structure  
Figure 7 presents an OMNeT++ simulation of the model of a modified compressed C2 
structure. Unlike the one proposed in [6], we only remove the supporting commander from the 
existing C2 structure and allow one global authority to direct the actions of regional COCOMs 
directly. Comparing Figure 7 to Figure 1, we can discern a distinct difference: the element 
Supporting_Command, representing STRATCOM, is deleted in Figure 7.  Instead, the regional 
COCOMs, represented by AOR1, AOR2, and AOR3, are directly connected to the 
Global_Authority.  We chose to leave the total number of weapons and sensors the same in order 
to avoid skewing the data; one could expect fewer messages if fewer units are participating; this 
explains why the global authority maintains two independent sensors. 
 
 
Figure 7.   OMNeT++ Model of a Modified Compressed C2 Architecture 
 
Without the extra supporting command, the global command now has additional duties 
which affect the message flow and algorithm of the model.  Specifically, the global authority 
   
previously maintained the weapons fired count as a variable by tracking the number of 
engagement updates received from the supporting command.  This was possible because each of 
these messages was sent from the AOR commanders to the supporting command and forwarded.  
In the case that the supporting command itself generated the engagement (a simulation of 
midcourse of terminal engagement in our model), a new engagement update was generated and 
forwarded to the global authority.  With the removal of the supporting command, the global 
authority now has to participate in engagements as well as track those of lower echelons.  This 
adds some responsibility and complexity to the role of this commander, whereas the previous 
model included a commander whose sole responsibility was to watch events unfold and 
intervene only when necessary. 
 
4.2 Flattened C2 Structure 
Figure 8 shows the OMNeT++ simulation model of a flattened C2 structure proposed by 
Weller et al., which attempts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the forces by 
“elimination of several links” along the chain of command, much like how the Special 
Operations Forces operated in Afghanistan without multiple layers of command above them.  
Under the flattened C2, the missile defense forces revolve around a central entity, namely the 
Global Authority with STRATCOM assuming this position.  The Global Authority has at its 
disposal its own sensors and weapons, as well as a robust set of sub-units with inherent 
capabilities to launch interceptors.   
 
 
Figure 8.   OMNeT++ Model of the Flattened C2 Architecture 
 
5. Simulation Results of the alternative BMD C2 Structures 
The experiments were conducted under the same conditions as the first model; simulations 
were conducted for 100 iterations under three scenarios (single missile/single AOR, multiple 
missile/single AOR, multiple missile/multiple AORs) for each of the two alterative models.  The 
results were captured and displayed accordingly in Tables 4 through 9. 
 
   
 
Table 4.  Single Missile, Single AOR summary results for the Compressed C2 Structure 
 
 




Table 6.  Multiple Missile, Multiple AOR summary results for the Compressed C2 Structure 
 
 
Table 7.  Single Missile, Single AOR summary results for the Flattened C2 Structure 
 
 
Table 8.  Multiple Missile, Single AOR summary results for the Flattened C2 Structure 
 
 
Table 9.  Multiple Missile, Multiple AOR summary results for the Flattened C2 Structure 
 
Figures 9-11 and Tables 10 show the effect of the two proposed C2 structures on the number 
of messages exchanged between the commands, the number of messages per threat missile 
processed by a command, the time spent per threat missile, and the number of interceptors fired 
per threat missile. 
 
























Figure 9.  Comparison of Messages Passed Between Commands 
 
















































Figure 11. Comparison of Processing Time per Threat Missile 
 
 
Table 10. Comparison of Interceptors Fired Per Threat Missile 
 
As expected, the simulation data show that there is a general reduction of the number of 
messages exchanged between commands when middle layers are removed from the existing 
BMD C2 structure. The flattened model generates the least amount of message per threat missile 
in our model because it is evident that there are less entities for messages to be exchanged with, 
eliminating the requirement for status updates to higher echelons which consume more time and 
effort for those units at the bottom rung of the ladder.  In fact, an entire type of message is 
eliminated.  The “engagement status” message type never manifests itself under these conditions.  
This is another unexpected result which runs counter to our initial expectations and forces us to 
reconsider our list of “essential messages,” since it has proven itself expendable in this case.  
 
messages per threat missile 
   
Figure 11 depicts a comparison of the average time per threat missile between the three 
models.  For the trivial case (single missile/single AOR) the difference is not staggering, 
however, with greater numbers of missiles from different directions, the flattened model actually 
takes the longest to respond in the second scenario while it does about as well as the current C2 
structure for the worst-case scenario.   One could have hypothesized that the opposite of what we 
find in Figure 11 to be true, relying on the assumption that lesser number of entities will result in 
improved performance, as declared by Weller [5].  However, one should keep in mind that the 
centralized Global Authority in the flattened model has become the sole authority with the 
combined responsibilities once shared by the regional COCOMs and the higher levels of 
command.  It must now generate the track data and armor the data with sufficient information to 
ensure that the data is good enough for the launching unit to rely on to execute its mission.  In 
effect, the centralized entity has to handle all nine messages on its own, from cradle to grave, in 
order to provide the missile defense force the properly discriminated and absolutely 
unquestionable data.  This creates a processing delay at the Global Authority level in the 
flattened model; the single C2BMC must now deal with having to track multiple targets as well 
as deal with additional, new data that it receives in order to create new tracks.   
 
Although these results suggest that the flattened chain of command is not practical on the 
surface, this complication can be overcome by appropriate resource allocation to the principal 
commander.  In [6], Weller et al. suggested that, “a centralized commander may have a better 
overall picture of the battlespace and be better equipped and staffed to most efficiently fight the 
battle.” Assuming that this commander could be provided with sufficient processing power to 
distribute delays across AORs, even if from afar, the limitation exposed in our model can be thus 
neutralized and the advantage of concurrent delays regained.  Furthermore, such a structure may 
provide additional flexibility if resources from one AOR could be brought to bear on threats 
originating or heading for another (one of many possible scenarios not addressed in our 
modeling).   
 
6. Conclusion 
The implication of removing a layer of command from the C2 structure is that the overall 
performance of the structure in response to missile threats in various scenarios is relatively better 
than that of the current C2 architecture with a more complex hierarchical arrangement.  The 
trend that was observed during the simulation of the current C2 structure was that as the 
scenario’s level of complexity increased, the C2 structure’s reactive ability to cope with the 
missiles degraded.  The same inclination towards degraded performance due to greater 
complexity of the scenario permeated throughout the compressed model.  One might have 
assumed that the removal of a layer of a hierarchy will have counter-balanced the complexity 
matter by cutting out formalities such as duplicate situational awareness messages being 
exchanged between hierarchies, thereby eliminating additional time required to conduct 
information exchange with higher headquarters; this is intuitively interpreted since most readers 
can relate to situations where conversation within a larger group of people is more intense and 
multifaceted, sometimes requiring multiple attempts at relaying the same information, than that 
of a smaller group of people where communication and thus the delivery of the essential points 
are much more effective and efficient.  However, the OMNeT++ experiments proved otherwise.  
   
It demonstrated that the removal of a layer intensified the effects of the fog of war and instead 
created an environment for reduced rate of success of interception.  However, as pointed out in 
Weller’s thesis [5], this fog of war can be lifted given the appropriate resource reallocation to the 
single centralized entity and that further modeling constituted from a foundation built on 
multiple C2BMCs at each level will yield different outcomes, specifically, one in which the 
flattened C2 structure is unanimously the winner.  
 
More refined models are needed to fully understand the impact of different C2 structures on 
missile defense. Future modeling should include estimates for awaiting human decisions, should 
a semi-automated system be selected over a fully automated one.  Our model does not represent 
delays for awaiting additional authority.  Selection of the appropriate level of government to 
permit an engagement has been under discussion for some time, to include some proposals that 
such permission be granted before the engagement actually unfolds based on current threat levels 
or specific intelligence.  
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